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NSC review completed

U.S. National Security Strategy

PART III  
Military Component

Section G  
Force Integration

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## SECTION G

### FORCE INTEGRATION (U)

#### SUMMARY

The Challenge. By the end of the 1980s, we will have improved capabilities to deploy and sustain forces worldwide and a better manned and more balanced total military force. However, under any realistic conditions, the risks will remain great throughout the decade. We pursue a strategy which seeks to deter war, but if war is thrust upon us, to control escalation and to prevail. No place overseas where our forces directly confront those of the Soviet Union do we have enough capability for these purposes. Our defense capabilities entail substantial risks that some regional objectives could not be achieved, some commitments to some allies could not be fulfilled, and, most importantly, we could be forced to resort to nuclear weapons. Risks can and must be attenuated by marshalling all elements of our national power in response to conventional aggression.

Requirements for Integration. Armed conflict involving the US requires that the full capabilities of all our armed Services be organized, trained, and equipped so that all can be readily deployed and employed together. Responding to any large contingency will require some level of mobilization. Our ability to swiftly reinforce forward forces, essential for all theaters, depends on the contributions of our reserve forces. In any event, our reinforcement capability is inadequate. Moreover, even if our initial efforts to stop Soviet aggression were successful, we would be less able to support a protracted war than would the Soviets. We must, therefore, expand the scope of mobilization and industrial capabilities and frequently review the all-volunteer force to insure adequacy of manpower.

Deterrence is dependent on both nuclear and conventional capabilities. The deterioration of the nuclear balance has eroded the credibility and utility of our nuclear "umbrella." That danger is compounded by growing Soviet conventional force capabilities. In redressing the imbalances, nuclear forces should not be viewed as a lower cost alternative to conventional forces. At the same time, the possible use of nuclear weapons must remain an element in our overall strategy to counter Soviet conventional aggression because it is unlikely we will have sufficient conventional forces in peacetime that will alone insure deterrence.

We are faced with growing vulnerability of our strategic deterrent. As a result, we need to enhance the survivability of offensive forces complemented by effective programs for continuity of government, strategic connectivity, and civil defense.

Over the longer term, control of space will be decisive in conflict. The military potential of space must be exploited in support of national security objectives.

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## Section G

## FORCE INTEGRATION (U)

1. The Challenge

For at least the remainder of the decade, the objectives of US national security policy cannot be met without risk. Our interests are global, and they conflict with those of a state which pursues worldwide political and economic policies inimical to our own. The Soviet Union maintains the largest military establishment in history, and now possesses the capability to project its military forces into Latin America and Africa as well as into countries on the Eurasian periphery. Their ability to establish or to maintain military presence (and a certain degree of political control) in various countries beyond the Warsaw Pact, such as Vietnam, Afghanistan, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Libya, Angola, Cuba, and Grenada, aggravates our defense problems. Compared with our own forces, in general, theirs will continue to be quantitatively superior and, in many cases, qualitatively equivalent. As a result, there is a dangerous imbalance in military strength which would favor the Soviet Union in several important contingencies (e.g., Southwest Asia, Europe). Even if we and our allies sustain 7% real growth in our defense efforts, this imbalance cannot be rectified before the end of the decade. Even then, the change in relative strength will depend upon future Soviet build-ups.

Our political and social heritage militates against our raising and supporting large forces in peacetime, and impels us rather to seek security in our national genius for technological innovation and industrial efficiency, and in our alliances. But requirements for domestic development and welfare will continue to weigh heavily upon our national decisions of overall resource allocation, and will constrain our force structure, and the pace and extent of our force modernization. While the same factors affect our allies, uncertainty about their resolve puts into question not only their collective ability to sustain in peacetime the needed response to the continuing Soviet military build-up, but also their reaction in a crisis or war.

We pursue a strategy which seeks to deter war, but if war is thrust upon us, to control escalation and to prevail. No place overseas where our forces directly confront those of the Soviet Union do we have enough capability for these purposes. Rather, deterrence rests on our ability to reinforce rapidly our forward deployed forces, and upon their evident capability, when reinforced, to inflict heavy losses in the event of aggression. Were a global war to break out, we could not reinforce everywhere at the same time. Rather, we would have to fight in some regions and avoid combat in others so as to help gain force superiority for counteroffensives in places and at times of our choosing. Such policy is, however, dependent on force mobility and our ability to selectively mass our forces. Our own force insufficiencies make all the more important effective coalition warfare, with allied forces deployed in coordination with our own. Initially, our purpose would be to slow, interdict, disrupt, and attrite the aggressors to gain time for mobilizing and deploying for counterstrikes, while maximizing nuclear capabilities to deter the Soviets from using their nuclear weapons and complement, as necessary, our other military capabilities. We would then launch operations calculated to achieve our objectives.

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Our defense capabilities, in short, entail substantial risks that some regional objectives could not be achieved in the initial stages of a conventional war, risks that some commitments to some allies could not be fulfilled, and most importantly, risks that we could be forced to resort to use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is essential that the United States improve its capability to mobilize additional forces rapidly and to expand defense production rapidly. Such a defense expansion would have to augment both conventional and nuclear forces. The purpose would be to reverse any setbacks during the initial campaigns by changing the balance of forces in our favor, or in favor of our Alliances. This very capability to mobilize and expand defense production will also help to strengthen deterrence.

Our risks can be attenuated if the US concert all elements of its national power--political, economic, military, and national will--toward achievement of its security objectives. Our defense effort alone, unsupported by other policies, cannot cope with the threats to our vital interests during this decade. While the political and economic elements are beyond the purview of this study, they are nonetheless essential to national security, and, as ensuing discussions will make evident, must be considered together with military elements.

2. Requirements for Integration. To optimize the potential of US forces, national security policy must direct the following:

a. Unified Forces. Modern warfare demands that we be prepared to use the full capabilities of all our armed Services in a truly unified effort. No one Service or one element within a single Service is sufficient to support the full gamut of modern warfare requirements.

b. Balanced Forces. Sustaining combat requires balance among combat and support forces. Neglect of any form of support severely limits the operational range and endurance of combatants. Balance is also needed between air, sea, and land forces; active and reserve forces; and forces based overseas and in the United States. Moreover, all must be organized, trained, and equipped so that all can be readily deployed and employed. Included must be mobility means necessary to deploy forces rapidly and resupply them, and requisite communication and intelligence means. In this respect, provisions for readiness, training, sustainability, modernized weaponry, and force structure require adroit defense investments: modernization can upgrade readiness and sustainability. Where force structure is out of balance between combat and support forces, acquisition of support structure can enhance readiness and sustainability. Funding priorities must go to functions that are most out of balance with strategy. For example, current emphasis is being placed on the strategic modernization plan, mobility, and naval forces.

c. Total Force, Active and Reserve. US forces are presently structured for these basic tasks:

(1) Peacetime operations (training, deterrence, presence, vigilance), including overseas/CONUS rotation.

(2) Response to minor contingencies.


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**TOP SECRET****(3) Global warfare with the USSR.**

We have insufficient active forces to fight a global war, or even to meet major lesser contingencies. The United States maintains an active duty force structure to deter conflict, to respond to minor contingencies, and to delay the achievement of an enemy's objective until US mobilization becomes effective. These forces are, however, dependent upon responsive, well-trained, and well-equipped reserves for all but the most minor contingencies, especially for airlift, medical, and other types of support. We must, therefore, bring more reserve units to a higher readiness status through equipment procurement and personnel increases. Decisions as to which capabilities to maintain in the reserve component should consider political as well as fiscal needs. Currently, there is an inordinate dependence on many types of support forces in the reserves, which unbalances active forces, and reduces overall readiness, responsiveness, and global flexibility. Responding to any large contingency will thus require some level of mobilization and expansion of force structure.

**d. Mobility**

(1) Chart 1 represents general purpose combat force structure and forward deployments. They are positioned out of regard for US presence, political acceptability both at home and abroad, and the need to maintain a pool of forces in the US both to respond flexibly to reinforce critical regions during contingencies and to sustain overseas units by rotating personnel and equipment. There is no prospective theater of war in which forward deployed forces would not have to be reinforced should war threaten. Our ability to swiftly reinforce them is the very heart of deterrence.




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Chart 1

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(2) Chart 2 portrays the general case for force generation in an overseas theater and is based on empirical data relating to specific theaters: forces ready to fight are a function of time, the amount of forward deployed forces, equipment and supplies prepositioned in-theater, and the availability of airlift and sealift. Forward deployed forces will be our first line of defense. They could be the only line unless pre-conflict measures have implemented an early reinforcement decision. Initial land-based reinforcements will, in most hypothesized circumstances, arrive by airlift. However fast, this is a very limited capability over great distances. The availability of prepositioned equipment and supplies can expand the impact of airlift capabilities by requiring only the movement of personnel and high value or unstorable equipment or otherwise reducing immediate transportation requirements. Fast sealift, which consists of ships that are readily available, are easily



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Chart 2

loaded, and travel in excess of 20 knots, can arrive in theater prior to the arrival of conventional sealift. The latter will provide the vast majority of movements in a long contingency. However, where airlift may be effective within hours, conventional sealift may require weeks. Because of the mass delivery capability of sealift, pre-conflict measures to load and even sail ships may be essential to providing effective opposition and defending our objectives. These capabilities must be integrated with force movement requirements and made adequate to meet the inter-theater and intra-theater deployment, employment, and

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sustainability requirements of global war. The present difficulty is depicted by the dashed line. Our ability to put additional forces in the field falls significantly short of the requirement based on current lift capability and expected warning times. Improvements in all areas which contribute to enhanced mobility are crucial; each makes a unique contribution to our capacity to respond to an overseas contingency.

(3) There are significant decisions that will be required in an actual deployment of forces. The difficulties are likely to be compounded when one or more theaters are competing for available lift and sustaining capabilities. Because of the number of possible scenarios, our limited forces, and the uncertainty surrounding Soviet intentions in any conflict, mobility enhancements offer a hedge against incorrect deployment of forces and provide the means for their redeployment. This is provided through a mix of lift capability and highly mobile forces.

(4) To be effective globally, our military mobility forces must have the capability and flexibility to provide rapid and sustainable support for independent operations in geographic regions where little or no modern, sophisticated airports or seaports are available. Even if our forces are capable of traveling thousands of miles, if they cannot disembark and transit a port or travel the remaining hundreds or even dozens of miles to an objective area, the operation will be unsuccessful. Responsive intra-theater mobility will be vital to battlefield success, especially in the case where total enemy forces outnumber our own.

#### e. Mobilization

(1) Active duty forces are our primary line of defense during peacetime and small contingencies. Even so, they are routinely augmented by reserve forces and civil assets in a great variety of functions. However, when preparing for a major crisis, exercising the Presidential 100,000 selective reserve callup authority will probably be required. Our reserve airlift and support forces are essential for any sizable deployment of general purpose forces. When a major crisis occurs, three levels of mobilization are available, depending on the severity of the situation: partial (1 million personnel), full (all reserve forces), and total (expansion beyond existing force structure). Effective mobilization capabilities, if exercised early in a major crisis, can serve as a deterrent. However, due to the requirement for Presidential or Congressional approval and the major associated fiscal and economic impacts, mobilization at any level is a very significant action.

(2) Our near-term security concerns are often driven by our estimates of the speed with which the Soviet forces might threaten our interests, constrained as we are by the inadequacies of our current military capabilities. However, if our initial efforts to forestall or stop Soviet aggression were successful, we would find ourselves unable to support our forces for protracted conflict. In this respect, they can now outlast us. We must, therefore, expand the scope of our mobilization and industrial planning to consider protracted conflict.

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(3) To strengthen deterrence of Soviet aggression, or to cope with aggression should it occur, it is important to strengthen and to develop preparation for mobilizing the armed forces and for carrying out a massive, rapid expansion of defense production. We must increase the responsiveness of our industrial base, especially our surge capability, and that of our national mobilization programs. Although the ability to fight a protracted conflict is dependent first upon adequate initial warfighting capability, programs addressing the early demands of a conflict must not be funded to the exclusion of the capability needed to endure and eventually prevail. Expansion to enhance military capabilities in peacetime also provides the basis for expediting the attainment of needed wartime production levels. Together with our own efforts, our friends and allies need to strengthen the responsiveness of their own industrial and mobilization bases. We must recognize that a political decision may be taken to massively expand our forces and defense production well in advance of a major involvement of US forces in war. It is important that the planning and the industrial base exist in order to reduce the time required to implement such a decision.

(4) Providing the manpower for active and reserve forces, especially the latter, will remain problematic. The decisions to maintain an all-volunteer force and draft registration must be frequently reviewed in light of the threat and the changing economy. While present trends are favorable, they may not remain so when the economy improves. Even if the combination of high pay and emoluments and poor performance in the economy remain, the declining number of 18 year olds in the coming decade and programmed force growth may make a return to the draft essential. The availability of adequate numbers of trained manpower is the key both to maintaining deterrence and providing the training base for wartime expansion. An effective Selective Service System is necessary to sustain our mobilized force.

f. Lower Level Conflicts

(1) Our ability to influence the outcome of low level conflicts not directly involving the United States depends, in part, on the peacetime relationships we have established with the factions involved. An integrated program of economic aid and military assistance can enhance US influence to prevent crises and conflicts from developing and increase the ability of friendly states and factions to defend themselves without involving US combat forces or to establish some degree of compatibility between US and indigenous forces in order to improve our capacity to work together in combat, if necessary. These outcomes can be facilitated by properly implemented security assistance programs. In the absence of an effective security assistance program, the likelihood of conflict increases, the likelihood of direct US involvement in conflict increases, and the effectiveness of US and regional forces decreases. The object of these programs must be to insure that US interests are protected in the most efficient and effective manner possible. Moreover, we must insure that no power vacuums and other sources of instability are created that tempt the Soviets or their surrogates.

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(2) Deterring or avoiding conflict requires that we are aware of the potential sources of discord and disharmony. We require comprehensive, objective intelligence not only of Soviet capabilities, preparations, and intent, as well as those of the states in potential conflict regions, but also those of our friends and allies and the vulnerabilities and desires of all concerned parties. We need this intelligence to reduce the period of ambiguity prior to a potential conflict and to increase the time in which the US can implement such measures as raising readiness conditions, callup or mobilization of reserve forces, movement of resources and forces forward within a theater, increased reconnaissance activity, or precautionary reinforcement of a theater. These actions should be accompanied by diplomatic activities to include prudent expansion of intelligence sharing with affected friends and allies.

(3) The inherent danger of pre-conflict measures is that they could provoke instead of deter conflict. Therefore, they must be integrated with appropriate diplomatic considerations to insure that no side feels impelled to wage war. These signals must make it clear to potentially hostile nations or forces that, by aggressive acts, they may bring their forces into battle with US forces and, in the case of the Soviet Union, risk a wider war or risk provoking US use of nuclear weapons. The latter case, by itself, is a deterrent, since it would mean crossing a distinct conflict threshold.

(4) While our responses to crises must always have diplomatic direction with the hopes of averting or curtailing hostilities, economic and indirect military contributions can further US interests without bringing US forces into direct combat. Specific examples are the provision of military training, hardware, supplies, medical assistance, and airlift. However, our willingness to respond to the needs of other states must be tempered by our own depleted stocks. The Special Defense Acquisition Fund will help in this regard as will our current build-up to higher levels of production. Training and other less direct involvement of US forces may be enhanced by the use of Special Operations Forces. Special Operations Forces can also be used to precede, complement, or enhance the effectiveness of regular forces, especially when the employment of more conventional forces is inappropriate due to political, terrain, or economy of effort considerations. Wherever non-combatant assistance can be provided, through security assistance, crisis settlement, or other aid, the costs must be weighed against those of direct intervention which are bound to be greater than any other aid program.

(5) Undoubtedly, one effective element of national power must be our national will to stand by friends. The perception of steadfast support and the confidence of trust with the United States has the proven potential to resolve crises or maintain a friendly state's will to resist and to persuade an aggressor to consider other, less provocative courses of action.

(6) Should our vital interests be threatened in conflicts not involving the Soviet Union and should local or regional forces prove unable to contain the threat, the US will be prepared to use its own forces.

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**TOP SECRET****g. Worldwide Conflict**

(1) Current US military capability does not permit us to engage successfully in simultaneous multi-theater operations. As a result, our military response must be based on regional priorities as described in Section C, the nature and sequence of the initial attack, the degree of preparation by both ourselves and our allies prior to the initiation of conflict, and the possibilities for nuclear war.

(2) A timely deployment of military force provides the possibility of deterring war, or of limiting conflict to a low level both in terms of forces engaged and intensity. A flexible global force projection capability can present the Soviets with effective opposition at the point of attack or, if we choose, another region important to the Soviets. The difficulty for the United States is that we will probably be forced to react to any crisis or aggression with great speed to avoid a fait accompli. However, in many scenarios involving Soviet forces, current US mobility capability cannot deliver sufficient forces soon enough or sustain them. Thus, our mid-term actions to increase the readiness and sustainability of our current forces, increase mobility assets, and strengthen our mobilization and industrial base are necessary first steps. We seek to be able to respond to a major threat in any region, and to reduce the Soviets' ability to force the United States into a choice of the surrender of vital interests, the spreading of the war to other theaters, or the employment of nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack.

**h. Nuclear and Conventional Force Integration**

(1) To deter, especially in light of our current conventional inferiority, nuclear forces must be capable of responding flexibly, confronting the enemy with the risk of further escalation in the event deterrence fails, and presenting a credible response. This implies an ability to execute a broad range of possible responses to achieve military objectives, to control escalation, and to terminate conflict on favorable terms at the lowest possible level of violence. It also implies that our response would not be inhibited or deterred by the counterthreat posed by the Soviet Union. At present, the relative nuclear balance has eroded the credibility and utility of our nuclear "umbrella." This means that the US may be increasingly unwilling to escalate to the nuclear level in accordance with our strategy. The danger of having less viable escalatory options is compounded by Soviet conventional force capabilities, and the consideration that once the nuclear threshold is crossed, even if by only the use of low yield, limited range weapons, the possibilities for controlling escalation are diminished. A further danger lies in Soviet use of chemical weapons which might impell us to cross the nuclear threshold.

(2) The visible inclusion of strategic systems in general war planning and exercises increases the credibility of our nuclear deterrence (NSDD-13 provides Presidential guidance on this issue). The uncertainty of intent and the possibility of misinterpretation associated with the use of any nuclear weapons dictate that extreme caution be used when deciding on their use. Specifically, the use of strategic systems in a role other than strategic nuclear exchange or

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non-strategic systems against strategic targets may carry particular danger of generating an escalatory response. However, the advent of new long range non-strategic nuclear systems (e.g., PERSHING II, GLCM) and increased flexibility on the employment of strategic systems blurs traditional distinctions between the two. This will increase our potential adversary's uncertainty. The role of our declaratory policy is to create uncertainty in the minds of the Soviets as to the nature of our nuclear options. This uncertainty, however, does not imply that we cannot employ nuclear weapons in a manner that can be understood by our adversaries in support of escalation control or that there is uncertainty in our minds as to the role of nuclear forces in our general war planning.

(3) The risks of nuclear war initiation are too great to permit nuclear forces to be viewed as a lower cost alternative to conventional forces. The use of nuclear forces to salvage a deteriorating conventional situation must be reserved for situations in which interests truly vital to the continuation of our fundamental security and freedoms are threatened and, most importantly, in which the use of such forces will not cause our position to deteriorate still further. The policy for the initial employment of non-strategic nuclear forces must carefully weigh the full implications of such employment, and an objective reevaluation of the nature of our threatened interests.

(4) It is unlikely that we will ever in peacetime attain a conventional force posture that alone can assure deterrence or achieve our military objectives in a major conflict. Therefore, the possible use of nuclear weapons must remain an element in our overall strategy. While strong conventional forces play a major role in deterring nuclear conflict by providing response options other than capitulation or nuclear war, a strong nuclear capability decreases the probability of a Soviet conventional attack due to the potential for escalation to nuclear war. For these reasons, negotiations for the control or limitation of any arms must consider the implications on our integrated forces and the overlap potential of all systems.

(5) In certain regions, such as NATO Europe, our interests are so vital that the United States is committed to the use, if necessary, of nuclear force to counter aggression. The United States should, however, avoid creating relationships with other states that have as a basic tenet the substitution of our nuclear capability for indigenous conventional forces. US commitments for the possible use of nuclear weapons must balance the deterrent value of such commitments with the danger that we could be drawn into escalatory actions when our fundamental objectives are not directly threatened. These commitments also undermine the incentives to these states to build or maintain adequate conventional forces.

#### i. Strategic Defensive Force Integration

(1) In the face of the growing vulnerability of land-based missiles and hardened targets to ICBM and potentially SLBM attack, we need to enhance the survivability of land based systems. An active ballistic missile defense, if technologically feasible and affordable, is one measure that could enhance survivability. The United States should pursue the development of effective BMD technology, evaluate its role in our overall strategic posture, and preserve the

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option to modify or withdraw from international agreements that would limit the deployment of a BMD system. However, we must recognize that our near and mid-term strategic vulnerability cannot be solved by BMD. Therefore, planned improvements to strategic offensive forces which enhance survivability must continue.

(2) Strategic defenses need not be impenetrable to enhance our nuclear strategy. They can still enhance deterrence by increasing both our civil survivability as well as the certainty that sufficient offensive strategic power will remain after an attack. This would reduce Soviet perceptions of advantages to be gained by initiating a nuclear attack.

(3) A modernized retaliatory capability must also be combined with an effective program for continuity of government (PD/NSC-58), survivable telecommunications (PD/NSC-53) and a credible civil defense program (NSDD-26) which provide for population protection, and defense of key defense industries. Taken together, these amount to a more credible warfighting potential, thereby enhancing deterrence.

j. Military Use of Space

(1) Space systems currently provide surveillance and communications for land, sea, undersea, and aerospace operations. Over the longer term, control of space will be decisive in conflict, and nations will vie for its control. The United States, with its increasing dependence on space-based systems, must maintain the capability to operate in space throughout the conflict spectrum, while denying any enemy the use of space in war, especially as autonomous space warfare systems are developed. The question is not whether space will be a medium for warfighting, but when, and who will dominate.

(2) The military potential of space must be exploited in support of potential combat operations in the air, on land, and on and under the sea. The integration of this potential, as well as the interface with the civilian space community, should be reviewed for possible assignment to the Secretary of Defense.

(3) Civilian space systems, equipment, and personnel training should incorporate the capability to support military requirements in wartime and be made available to support military operations if conditions require.

k. Complementary Measures

(1) The costly realities of our own defense build-up, domestic opposition, and uncertain allied cooperation dictate that we strive to restrict the Soviet build-up. It is not enough merely to plan for a steady increase in US and allied defense spending, at present or even higher projected rates. Such a policy would be both dispirited and risky. With the momentum of a massive 20-year defense build-up, the Soviets could continue to outpace us during this decade. Our political support for the continued growth in defense spending might be lost if the competition appeared like a futile "arms race," with no end in sight. Hence, as an essential complement of our defense effort, we need a

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policy to engender and sustain economic pressure on Soviet defense spending (such as efforts to restrict Western credits and military technology). In addition, measures are needed to generate or encourage political pressures on the Soviet government, so as to deflect it from its relentless pursuit of greater military power.

(2) The transfer of advanced Western technology to the Soviet Union and its allies undermines Western national security efforts in all other areas. For years, whatever edge we had over the Warsaw Pact was primarily of a qualitative nature. Uncontrolled, or even loosely controlled, transfer of Western technology to the Warsaw Pact allies merely accelerates the elimination of that edge. We must, therefore, act in concert with our Allies to insure that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact do not benefit from the technological and industrial efficiencies and advances that we have developed. In particular, we must act with greater care to limit the flow of dual use technology, whose military applications often are not obvious to the West while they are a boon to our potential adversaries.

### 3. RISK ASSESSMENT

a. The decade of the 1980s will be a very dangerous period for the West due to the variety of conditions out-lined in Section A. Recent increases in Defense expenditures that allow the United States to begin redressing the shortfalls between forces and requirements and reverse the trends of the previous decade of declining US military strength in the face of growing Soviet capabilities are a welcome first step toward reducing those dangers.

b. Near-Term Risks. US forces, in conjunction with appropriate allied forces, must be capable of dealing with Soviet aggression on a worldwide basis. The resources required to accomplish this objective have not been provided in previous years. The resulting risks will be greatest in the following areas: the balance between the US and USSR strategic nuclear forces; the balance of non-strategic nuclear forces; the relative conventional force generation capabilities of the United States and the USSR in regions of vital interest; lack of sufficient mobility assets to meet global strategy requirements for flexibility; the lack of material to sustain forces until industrial-based production rates can be increased to satisfy demands; and the need for modernization of nuclear, chemical, and conventional forces. All are essential to our strategy and, in short, we are deficient in nearly every area. Addressal of these risks must be balanced with the need for increased force structure and readiness against a continually more potent and dangerous Soviet threat.

c. Nuclear Forces. Although the US no longer possesses clear nuclear superiority, the programs to modernize and upgrade US nuclear deterrent capability will provide enhanced prospects, albeit not superiority, for viable nuclear deterrence into the 1990s. Without these investments, the risks of nuclear blackmail that unduly restricts our international political latitude and nuclear war would dangerously increase by the second half of this decade.

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d. General Purpose Forces

(1) Current general purpose forces are adequate to maintain most peacetime forward deployments and to respond to minor crises, but attendant strains on manpower and readiness to maintain these capabilities remain. These forces currently contribute to deterring direct Soviet aggression in Europe, Southwest Asia, and Northeast Asia. However, because of the continuing increases in Soviet conventional force capabilities, major risks would confront US forces if they should become engaged in direct conflict with Soviet forces in any of those theaters.

(2) Regarding global conflict with the Soviets, current general purpose forces are not adequate to assure success in the event of major conflict. A most pressing difficulty is our current inability to transport currently available forces to potential crisis regions in a timely manner and sustain them in combat. If engaged and another crisis occurs elsewhere, land and air forces cannot be redeployed rapidly to the other region, nor may they be reinforced or adequately sustained due to lack of sufficient lift.


(3) By the end of the 1980s, US force posture, although still involving significant risk, will have improved capabilities to deploy and sustain general purpose forces worldwide and a better manned and more balanced total military force within realistic resource constraints. However, the relative risk faced today may endure if the Soviets continue their current pace of force capability development.

(4) Throughout the decade, our capabilities to successfully oppose the Soviets in any global region will remain dependent upon the productive use of available warning time, timely decisions, and the adequate readiness, manning, and equipping of US and allied forces that will enable them to deploy rapidly and fight effectively. An inherent risk will remain should the US become involved in any theater. Forces available for ensuing crises in other geographic regions will be greatly reduced and deployment times increased. However, the programmed increased capabilities, sustainability, and readiness of US forces for global deployment and employment will better serve to deter actual tests of our military prowess.

e. As Chart 3 indicates, our current defense program does not achieve the force levels required to secure our national objectives with a high degree of certainty. The FYDP leaves us with a set of inadequacies which may tempt the Soviet Union to press its advantage. If the FYDP is fully funded, and if the military component of our national strategy as outlined in Part III is fully addressed, the risks are considerably reduced. If, however, these conditions are not met, and if funding falls below the FYDP, the risk will remain high.

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Chart 3

f. Continued Assessment. Based upon the projected threat throughout this decade and into the 1990s, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will provide an annual assessment of the effectiveness of current and programmed US forces, and force levels and capabilities required to attain national security objectives with reduced risk. This assessment will identify risks inherent in current and programmed capabilities. These required force levels and risk assessments will be used to guide the development of annual peacetime defense programs and as the basis for rapid total mobilization that would be required in any sustained global conflict.

4. Strategic Alternatives. Within the scope of our generalized global strategic approach, there are numerous opportunities and near-term requirements to examine alternative approaches that deal with the threats to our vital interests. Such alternatives cannot resolve or eliminate the need for improvements upon the current military force posture. At best, they can only redistribute risks, for clearly, in view of the worldwide Soviet threat, the demands of any viable strategy will overtask our military capability throughout this decade. However, the potential for technological breakthroughs, use of space, exploitation of cruise missile technology, ongoing force improvements, and the ever-changing international order suggest that we cannot remain bound by a single strategic view. Approaches, such as the counter-offensive option, should be developed to improve the opportunities to defend our vital interests within expected constraints. In all cases, these must be a compendium of integrated political, economic, and military policies.

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